Secondary Sources
Directions:
Answer the following questions based on the secondary source excerpts on this page.
Answer the following questions based on the secondary source excerpts on this page.
The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005 (excerpt)
Even after it became clear that Saddam [Hussein] sought to develop nuclear capability, the Bush administration provided Iraq with agricultural products, military intelligence, and financial access. Rather than focusing its efforts solely on much-needed post-war economic reconstruction, Iraq used American economic support for military purpose, a fact known to at least some American officials.
The conciliatory approach toward Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War failed to change Iraq’s behavior. In fact, it may have led Saddam to believe the U.S. would not react as strongly to his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After all, if it had been placating him, despite his threatening behavior, would it be alarmed enough about the invasion of Kuwait that it would send a massive force to the region to reverse the invasion? Would it sacrifice blood and treasure to save what it saw as an illegitimate monarchy in control of a big oil well?
Yetiv, Steve The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005, (John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 74-75.
Discursive Legacies: The U.S. Peace Movement and "Support the Troops" (excerpt)
Support our boys and girls, no matter one’s position on the impending ground offensive.” President George H.W. Bush (1991) emphasized those words in his State of the Union Address in 1991. Honoring, those who served with yellow ribbons. The focus was on the yellow ribbon more than on the conflict itself. Stopping the American people from questioning why were we entering Kuwait.
Patrick G. Coy, Lynne M. Woehrie, Gregory M. Maney. "Discursive Legacies: The U.S. Peace Movement and "Support the Troops"." Social Problems Vol. 55 No 2, May 2008: 171.
The Desert of Experience: Jarhead and the Geography of the Persian Gulf War (excerpt)
A depiction of the Persian Gulf War in contemporary American combat differs dramatically from public discourse surrounding the war. Media coverage of the war has been widely documented for its preoccupation with emergent military technologies. During the war the Pentagon teamed up with cable networks to inundate the American public with spectacles of Stealth Bombers, Scud missiles, Patriot missiles, Tomahawk missiles and smart bombs in action. The Highly censored media coverage obscured the regions geography and erased the suffering of combatants as well as civilians.
Wright, Geoffrey A. "The Desert of Experience: Jarhead and the Geography of the Persian Gulf War." Modern Language Association of America, 2009: 1677.
The University at War (excerpt)
With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime some Iraqi intellectuals had high hopes of a inhabiting such a world. Allowed to read and debate books that had been banned for decades, including Marxist and Shi’ite texts, free at last from the anti-intellectual bullying of the Baath party, the sanctions regime over, they imagined a renaissance of the Iraqi academy. An opportunity to return to the intellectual Birthplace of civilization.
It would not be the case; the first calamity was the looting, with the U.S. troops guarding only the ministry of oil and the ministry of the interior despite pleas to help protect the cultural heritage sites of Iraq from anticipated looting, A plague of human locusts descended unchecked to pick clean and destroy libraries, museums and university buildings
Gusterson, Hugh. "The University at War." 2010: 6.
War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (excerpt)
When King Husayn and President Mubarak met at Alexandria to discuss ways and means for an Arab solution, they requested President Bush in a telephone conversation to give them enough time to resolve the crisis. Had Bush allowed the two Arab leaders to carry out their proposed plan, the question of the maintenance of international peace and security might not have arisen nor might not the protection of Western interests have needed foreign intervention. Bush, however, insisted that the invasion was a threat to Western interests and even hesitated to give King Husayn and Mubarak forty-eight hours to do their job. He went as far as to disrupt the cooperative efforts of the Arab leaders by persuading Mubarak to issue a condemnation of the invasion and consequently he sided with him, leaving King Husayn to deal with the crisis alone.
Khadduri, Majid; Ghareeb, Edmund. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications, Oxford University Press, 2001: 256.
Even after it became clear that Saddam [Hussein] sought to develop nuclear capability, the Bush administration provided Iraq with agricultural products, military intelligence, and financial access. Rather than focusing its efforts solely on much-needed post-war economic reconstruction, Iraq used American economic support for military purpose, a fact known to at least some American officials.
The conciliatory approach toward Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War failed to change Iraq’s behavior. In fact, it may have led Saddam to believe the U.S. would not react as strongly to his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After all, if it had been placating him, despite his threatening behavior, would it be alarmed enough about the invasion of Kuwait that it would send a massive force to the region to reverse the invasion? Would it sacrifice blood and treasure to save what it saw as an illegitimate monarchy in control of a big oil well?
Yetiv, Steve The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005, (John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 74-75.
Discursive Legacies: The U.S. Peace Movement and "Support the Troops" (excerpt)
Support our boys and girls, no matter one’s position on the impending ground offensive.” President George H.W. Bush (1991) emphasized those words in his State of the Union Address in 1991. Honoring, those who served with yellow ribbons. The focus was on the yellow ribbon more than on the conflict itself. Stopping the American people from questioning why were we entering Kuwait.
Patrick G. Coy, Lynne M. Woehrie, Gregory M. Maney. "Discursive Legacies: The U.S. Peace Movement and "Support the Troops"." Social Problems Vol. 55 No 2, May 2008: 171.
The Desert of Experience: Jarhead and the Geography of the Persian Gulf War (excerpt)
A depiction of the Persian Gulf War in contemporary American combat differs dramatically from public discourse surrounding the war. Media coverage of the war has been widely documented for its preoccupation with emergent military technologies. During the war the Pentagon teamed up with cable networks to inundate the American public with spectacles of Stealth Bombers, Scud missiles, Patriot missiles, Tomahawk missiles and smart bombs in action. The Highly censored media coverage obscured the regions geography and erased the suffering of combatants as well as civilians.
Wright, Geoffrey A. "The Desert of Experience: Jarhead and the Geography of the Persian Gulf War." Modern Language Association of America, 2009: 1677.
The University at War (excerpt)
With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime some Iraqi intellectuals had high hopes of a inhabiting such a world. Allowed to read and debate books that had been banned for decades, including Marxist and Shi’ite texts, free at last from the anti-intellectual bullying of the Baath party, the sanctions regime over, they imagined a renaissance of the Iraqi academy. An opportunity to return to the intellectual Birthplace of civilization.
It would not be the case; the first calamity was the looting, with the U.S. troops guarding only the ministry of oil and the ministry of the interior despite pleas to help protect the cultural heritage sites of Iraq from anticipated looting, A plague of human locusts descended unchecked to pick clean and destroy libraries, museums and university buildings
Gusterson, Hugh. "The University at War." 2010: 6.
War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (excerpt)
When King Husayn and President Mubarak met at Alexandria to discuss ways and means for an Arab solution, they requested President Bush in a telephone conversation to give them enough time to resolve the crisis. Had Bush allowed the two Arab leaders to carry out their proposed plan, the question of the maintenance of international peace and security might not have arisen nor might not the protection of Western interests have needed foreign intervention. Bush, however, insisted that the invasion was a threat to Western interests and even hesitated to give King Husayn and Mubarak forty-eight hours to do their job. He went as far as to disrupt the cooperative efforts of the Arab leaders by persuading Mubarak to issue a condemnation of the invasion and consequently he sided with him, leaving King Husayn to deal with the crisis alone.
Khadduri, Majid; Ghareeb, Edmund. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications, Oxford University Press, 2001: 256.